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One of the most critical public policy issues in the United States is
the conflict between the rights of private property ownership and the
public interest. Often termed the "taking issue," it is at the core of
most land use controversies. The debate typically centers around
whether and to what extent the public sector is required by law to
compensate real property owners for public actions that have the
effect of precluding maximum economic return from sale of their
property.' Conventional measures such as zoning and other regulatory
approaches have failed to resolve the recurring compensation dilem-
ma.2 It is not surprising therefore, that a technique has emerged which
purports to combine aspects both of regulation and public compensa-
tion. Termed the "transfer of development rights" (TDR), this device
has engendered considerable discussion and speculation as to its po-
tential effectiveness in resolving the taking issue. Unfortunately, too
little attention has been directed to its potential negative effects, in
particular the inequities that are likely to result from a poorly designed
TDR system. The purpose of this Article is to analyze examples of the
two major types of TDR measures advanced to date, to identify poten-
* Research for the Article was conducted under a grant from the Ford Foundation to
the Urban Institute. The author expresses his gratitude to both institutions for their
assistance.
** Assistant Professor, Dep't. of Urban and Regional Planning, George Washington
University. A.B., Bucknell University, 1964; M.S., Boston University, 1968; M.Ed.,
Harvard University, 1969; M.C.P., University of Pennsylvania, 1971.
1. J. BANTA, F. BOSSELMAN AND D. CALLIES, THE TAKING ISSUE 1-2 (1973).
2. Id. at 212-35.
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tial areas of inequity and to discuss an alternative approach which
might mitigate, if not resolve, these liabilities.
Transfer of development rights3 is a concept which is being used
by several municipalities 4 to expand their control over privately-
owned land without invoking eminent domain powers.5 The basis of
the concept is the severance of development rights from a privately-
owned parcel of land combined with a guarantee to the owner that the
rights can vest at some future date on a similarly situated piece of
property.6 TDR rejects the traditional premise that property own-
ership means dominion over a particular piece of land.' Instead, the
concept is based on the idea that property ownership is merely the
ownership of a "bundle of rights" which is not necessarily tied to a
single parcel of property." As a result of this rights transfer, the
municipality may place restrictions on the use of the owner's land
which would ordinarily qualify as "takings" under the fifth amend-
ment. 9
Courts have uniformly agreed on the constitutional validity of the
basic concept."0 When the municipality makes a transfer of rights
mandatory however, it is critical that the severance of the development
3. The literature now abounds with articles and studies which explore this technique
at great length and in so doing, provide a much more comprehensive explanation than is
possible in the present article.
A very helpful discussion of TDR's basic mechanics and legal history appears in F.
Schnidman, Transferable Development Rights: An Idea in Search of Implementation, I I
LAND AND WATER L. REV. 339 (1976). See also, M. BAILEY, P. FOSTER AND F. SCHNID-
MAN, TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: ARE THEY A STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF
BETTER LAND USE MANAGEMENT? 1-8 (1974); TDR: What's Happening Now, 7 PRACTIC-
ING PLANNER 10-14 (1977); F. James and D. Gale, Problems and Promises of Transfer-
able Development Rights for Land Use Planning (Urban Institute Working Paper No.
0800-02-1 1-73, 1976).
4. See Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
5. See generally Carmichael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land
Use Control, 2 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 35 (1974); Costonis, Development Rights Transfer:
An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75 (1973).
6. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976).
7. Marcus, Mandatory Development Rights Transfer and the Takings Clause: The
Case of Manhattan's Tudor City Parks, 24 BUFFALO L. REV. 77, 86-89 (1974).
8. Id.
9. 90 HARV. L. REV. 637, 638-39 (1977).
10. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976); Trinity Place Co. v. Finance Admin., 38 N.Y.2d 144, 341
N.E.2d 536, 379 N.Y.S.2d 16 (1975); Penn. Central Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 50
App. Div. 2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975).
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rights does not destroy the value of those rights to the owner."
For purposes of this analysis TDR measures can be grouped into two
major categories: compensatory and redistributive. Compensatory
TDR schemes xvould be used to achieve public land use planning
objectives while attempting to ensure legally adequate compensation
for affected property owners. Redistributive schemes, while not insen-
sitive to planning and compensation issues, focus on promoting a
reallocation of development rights among designated property owners
according to criteria which, it is maintained, would more equitably
distribute this form of wealth. These distinctions are elaborated in the
following discussion.
II. COMPENSATORY MEASURES
Representative of most compensatory TDR schemes is the
Georgetown Waterfront proposal. 2 Though not yet enacted into law, it
was prepared through the sponsorship of citizens living in the historic
Georgetown area of Washington, D.C. as a means of protecting part of
that neighborhood's fine stock of eighteenth and nineteenth century
buildings. The area along the Potomac River waterfront is under in-
tense pressures for redevelopment to office, commercial and transpor-
tation uses. The Georgetown TDR scheme would allow transfer of
development rights from waterfront area properties to transfer dis-
tricts located in appropriate sections of the District of Columbia.' 3
Owners of designated parcels in the transfer districts would be permitt-
ed to exceed the zoned density in new construction projects by a
specified degree if they purchased the necessary number and type of
rights.' 4 A waterfront property owner would be issued rights as a
function of the difference between the square footage of the existing
use on his parcel and the permitted square footage under zoning.' 5 A
specified number of rights would be assigned for each 1,000 square
I1. Fred F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d
381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976). The court in French invalidated a TDR scheme which did
not provide a definite time for reattachment of the development rights to a parcel of
property for the precise value of the development rights when reattached.
12. WALLACE, McHARG, ROBERTS AND TODD, GEORGETOWN AREA PLAN AND DEVEL-
OPMENT MANAGEMENT PROGRAM App. C. at 1-8 (1975).
13. Id. at I. Though not cited in the report, the consultants and various public
officials had discussed the possibility of transferring development rights to certain areas
now under construction in Washington, D.C. See Von Eckardt, Getting Charm and
Height, Washington Post, Feb. 27, 1971, § C, at 1, col. 5.
14. WALLACE, MCHARG, ROBERTS AND TODD, GEORGETOWN AREA PLAN AND DEVEL-
OPMENT MANAGEMENT PROGRAM App. C. at 6 (1975).
15. Id. at 2-3.
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feet of this "surplus" square footage. 16 If, for example an owner's
property is zoned for 50,000 square feet and the existing use occupies
35,000 square feet, his development rights would be issued in some
proportion to the remaining 15,000 square feet. The increment by
which permitted densities could exceed those allowed by the zoning
maps on individual transfer district proposals would be limited accord-
ing to the capacity of the area to accommodate newly generated traff-
ic. 17 That is, where expected traffic volume would exceed the capacity
of the surrounding streets, the density increase permitted using devel-
opment rights would be moderated. 18 Development rights would be
taxed as real property and tax liabilities would be adjusted accordingly
for both parties to a TDR transaction. 19
The observer schooled in the realities of real estate economics will
quickly find fault with development rights assignments made on the
basis of spatial measurements such as density. There is no assurance
that, at the least, the market value of development rights originating in
the waterfront will equal their value to developers in the Metro route
vicinity. It seems inequitable for the recipient of rights to rely on the
vicissitudes of the unknown and untested supply and demand system
of the newly established development rights market in recouping any
value losses due to restrictive public regulations. Indeed, successful
court challenges have been waged under similar circumstances.2 0 Fur-
thermore the granting to the recipient of development rights equivalent
only spatially to the lost development potential on his property may
just increase judicial and public resistance to such a program.
Undoubtedly, in anticipation of this difficulty, the proposed Ver-
mont TDR scheme incorporates a more sophisticated formula. Devel-
oped by a group of prominent state environmental activists, the Ver-
mont proposal is directed toward the control of growth and the preser-
vation of open space. 21 In implementing the Vermont measure a local
government would conduct an appraisal of each property in the juris-
diction, establishing both its current use and market values. 22 Devel-
16. Id. at 1.
17. Id. at 3.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 7.
20. Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Development Rights, 84 YALE L.J.
1101 (1975).
21. L. Wilson, A Land-Use Control System Based on Transferable Development
Rights 1-7 (1974) (unpublished paper for Vermont Natural Resources Council).
22. Id. at 4.
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opment rights would be apportioned to each property owner as a
function of the difference in these values.23 The sum of the differences
for all eligible properties in the jurisdiction would constitute the dollar
value of the maximum permissible volume of development.24 A new
master plan would be prepared restricting new development to the
volume represented by this dollar value. 25 In order to develop his land
to the maximum allowable extent, the owner would have to purchase
development rights equivalent to the anticipated value of the new use,
established by an up-to-date appraisal. 26 If a developer wanted to build
on a newly-acquired property, it would be necessary for him to obtain
rights equivalent to the difference between the appraised present use
value and the sale price (less any development rights already attached
to the property at purchase). 27 After a specified period of time, devel-
opment rights prices would be established on the open market, rather
than through appraisal. 28
As should be evident, the Vermont TDR variant is more sensitive
than the Georgetown scheme to the intricacies of accurate valuation of
development rights and owner claims to adequate compensation.
Under the latter proposal, development rights are issued in units cor-
responding to a spatial measurement, to wit, the square footage per-
mitted under the zoning code which has not been "absorbed" by the
property's existing use. The Vermont proposal however, would allo-
cate rights to each owner as a function of the difference between the
market and existing use values of his property. 29 Basing these values
on current sales and appraisal techniques would seem to decrease the
probability that owners would receive less compensation for devel-
opment potential lost due to restrictive public regulations than could
occur under TDR systems which utilize spatial measurements. Unlike
the Georgetown Waterfront scheme, the Vermont TDR proposal could
take into account the effects of nearby public improvements and
locational variables in valuation assignment of development rights to
eligible property owners through commonly used professional apprais-
al techniques. 30 Though spatial unit measurement of development
23. Id. at 5.
24. Id. at 5-6.
25. Id. at 6.
26. Id. at 5-6.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 4.
30. Id. An obvious difficulty with measuring development rights in terms of the
1977]
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rights undoubtedly would be less troublesome and time-consuming
administratively for local officials, the employment of dollar value
appraisal methods would seem to be worth the extra time and re-
sources necessary, especially if the threat of costly court challenges
could be minimized.
Even if the issue of fair valuation of development rights somehow is
resolved, there are other potential inequities associated with the com-
pensatory TDR systems. Property owners and residents literally at the
other end of the transfer process, in whose environs rights could be
used to increase allowable densities, should be given more con-
sideration. This group is composed primarily of developers and
tenants/purchasers of their properties. Recall that the Georgetown
Waterfront proposal, similar in concept to most compensatory TDR
systems, would permit property owners in the historic waterfront area
to separate and transfer their development rights for use by developers
owning property in designated transfer districts. One might conclude
that the purchasers of these rights would be absorbing the costs of
preservation. The Georgetown scheme and others, however, provide
that lowering zoning densities of right in transfer districts can occur, if
necessary, to stimulate demand for rights. 31 In such situations the
developer would have to purchase rights equivalent to the density lost
due to the downzoning, if he desired to build to the originally permitted
level. Obviously, these persons stand to suffer a disproportionate
share of the burden of preservation costs compared to developers in
other parts of Washington whose property holdings are not subject to
downzoning.
Even where downzonings are not allowed however, the developer in
the transfer district still could be burdened inequitably. For example,
the Chicago Plan suggests that requests for rezonings to higher densi-
ties be granted, but to lower levels than asked for by property owners.
The remaining margin of density needed would be purchased in the
form of development rights. 32 Normally however, transfer district de-
square footage of unused building potential is that a given unit of space has widely
varying values in different locations. A square foot of residential space in an historic
building near a major office tower may be worth far less to potential purchasers in
transfer districts where less development has occurred and land values are lower.
31. For a discussion of lowering densities-of-rights, see J. CosTONIS, SPACE ADRIFT
102-03 (1974) (hereinafter cited as SPACE ADRIFt).
32. Id. at 50. The authors of a TDR proposal for protecting prime farmland in
Maryland suggest that the state government be empowered to acquire development
rights through purchase in the open market and through condemnation. This practice,
they feel, will aid in controlling the supply of development rights and therefore will help
to prevent lagging demand and low prices. See M. BAILEY, P. FOSTER AND F. SCHNID-
MAN, TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS: ARE THEY A STEP IN THE DIRECTION OF
BETTER LAND USE MANAGMENT? 1, 5 (1974).
[Vol. 14:81
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velopers would be allowed to build to densities permitted by the
existing zoning map.33 Incremental density increases above this level
could be achieved only through the purchase of a specified number of
rights, subject to analyses of environmental and public services
capacities, urban design considerations and market studies. 34 Devel-
opers would appear to be in a position where, at the very least, they
would suffer no financial losses compared to their expected return had
they purchased no rights and built only to the maximum density al-
lowed by zoning. Indeed, it would seem that the development rights
acquisition could enable them to substantially augment their financial
return and would thus, constitute an attractive incentive.
Again, though, developers would be disproportionately burdened
with preservation costs when compared to developers in other parts of
the city able to secure rezonings, variances or other public largesse to
achieve the same densities. 35 Therefore, unless these zoning changes
were prohibited for similar classes of property throughout Chicago and
Washington, the TDR schemes would seem to invite judicial challenge.
The Georgetown Waterfront measure raises other questions about
the distribution of costs. Tenants/purchasers are another group of
persons susceptible to shouldering an inordinant preservation cost of
new real estate developments in transfer districts (those areas eligible
to receive transferred development rights). Since the developer in the
transfer district had to purchase density permissions that developers of
similar properties in other parts of the city received at lower costs
through conventional rezonings and variance proceedings, he will pro-
bably be forced to charge higher rents/prices. If the supply of transfer
district properties such as high-rise apartments and office buildings in
Washington is rather large, it is likely that most tenants/purchasers
would invest outside the districts. If on the other hand, the supply is
33. SPACE ADRIFT, note 31 supra, at 50.
34. Id. at 48-52.
35. Consider, for example, the builder who wants to construct a large apartment
complex in an area of Chicago located just outside the transfer district boundaries. If the
site is zoned at a density and use insufficient for these purposes, he could take the
conventional route and apply for a variance or zoning amendment. Though the expenses
associated with this procedure in legal fees and lost construction time are not usually
inconsequential, it is likely that they will not often equal the cost of purchasing devel-
opment rights in an open market. This developer, then, may have a decided advantage
over his counterpart in a transfer district.
Another student of TDR has expressed concern over the equitability of requiring
developers to absorb the costs of preservation and ponders the ultimate effect on inner
city economic development. See Note, Development Rights Transfer and Landmarks
Preservation-Providing a Sense of Orientation, 9 URBAN L. ANN. 131, 155 (1975).
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constrained, they might have no other option but to rent or purchase
property inside of the district. Obviously, under the first alternative,
developers of property within transfer districts may be penalized be-
cause they cannot compete effectively with their counterparts outside
the transfer district due to variable treatment by local public officials
imposed by the selective TDR program. Hence, developers are forced
to shoulder a disproportionate share of the costs of preservation.
Under the second alternative, tenants/purchasers are negatively affect-
ed because their market choices are limited by a restricted supply of
apartments and/or offices. They may shoulder a greater share of the
preservation burden in these circumstances.3 6
Speculating on the impact that compensatory-type TDR schemes
would have on other groups of persons is somewhat more problematic-
al, optimistic predictions notwithstanding. 37 For example, the effect of
TDR on properties in the vicinity of land parcels to which development
rights have been transferred is unclear. Values on these holdings could
increase due to nearby high density improvements or, in the alterna-
tive, they could plummet if higher densities had significantly undesir-
able environmental effects. Commendably, the Chicago Plan attempts
to minimize these difficulties through design controls, but the
Georgetown and other TDR systems pay them little heed.
38
Though some of the probable effects of compensatory TDR schemes
are unclear, it is evident that there are significant, identifiable groups
of people who would suffer an inordinate share of the costs of provid-
ing environmental preservation and improved land use planning serv-
ices to the general public. The response of those who find fault with
36. A similar conclusion was reached by researchers at the University of Pennsylva-
nia's Regional Science Research Institute. See Berry & Steiker, An Economic Analysis
of Transferable Development Rights, 17 NAT. RESOURCES J. 74 (1977). The authors
conclude:
Finally, we observe that a successful TDR scheme constitutes a form of protective
control over the landscape such that the distribution of rents accruing to land
owners in the growth and no-growth zones is in some narrow sense equitable. But
the TDR approach does not take into consideration the larger question of the equity
of the consumers of floor space paying rents ultimately to owners of land and
development rights. Rather, this method passively accepts the transfer of wealth
from the consumers of floor space to land owners and development rights holders
and deals only with the redistributional aspects of land use control within these
narrow confines.
Id. at 74 (emphasis added). Though there is obvious disagreement between this position
and the present author's on the equity of TDR to affected property owners in "growth
zones," there is no difference of opinion over TDR's impact on tenants/purchasers.
37. Shales, Who Pays for Transferable Development Rights?, 40 PLAN. 7-9 (1974).
38. SPACE ADRiFr, note 31 supra, at 134-44.
[Vol. 14:81
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compensatory approaches to the transfer of development rights is
illustrated by a second group of TDR schemes which is less concerned
with political or legal difficulties arising out of the taking issue. In-
stead, these proposals, which I term "redistributive TDR measures,"
would attempt to distribute net losses or gains on some equitable basis
to all eligible property owners. The propsed New Jersey Growth Man-
agement Program and the Carmichael proposal are illustrative of redis-
tributive TDR measures.
III. REDISTRIBUTIVE MEASURES
Under a proposal developed for communities in New Jersey, a local
government desiring to preserve fragile environmental areas would
prepare a Growth Management Program (GMP). 39 The GMP would
analyze ecological conditions in the jurisdiction and existing and ex-
pected public service needs. 40 It would delineate areas to be preserved
and others in which development could occur.4' The capacity of the
latter areas to accept new growth would be determined.42 From this
analytical process, maximum permissible densities of development
would be designated for each area. Residential development rights
would be created proportional to the numbers of dwelling units or
bedroom units allowed by the GMP.43 Commercial and industrial rights
could be established on the basis of permitted square footage of space
in the GMP. Under an optional conversion formula, residential, in-
dustrial and commercial development rights could be created as a
function of the total acreage of each category permitted by the GMP. 45
39. B. CHAVOOSHIAN, G. NiESWAND & T. NORMAN, GROWTH MANAGEMENT PRO-
GRAM: A PROPOSED NEW APPROACH TO LOCAL PLANNING AND ZONING 1-26 (1974).
40. Id. at 10-13. The GMP proposal places emphasis on employment of a sophis-
ticated analysis of environmental conditions because it is intended primarily for com-
munities where considerable undeveloped areas (e.g., farms) exist. Such an analysis is
less important, of course, in heavily populated areas such as Chicago and thus, was not a
major concern in the Chicago Plan as discussed by Professor Costonis. Both the GMP
and the Chicago Plan however, stress the importance of careful studies of the existing
and expected capacities of public service systems such as sewerage, police and fire
protection and public streets.
41. Id. at 11-12.
42. Id. at 12-14.
43. Id. at 16. For example, one development right might equal one bedroom unit or
one dwelling unit.
44. Id. at 16-17. For example, one development unit could equal 5000 square feet.
45. For example, if the GMP's analysis indicated that environmental and public
services capacities would permit a total of 200 acres of residentially-zoned land, a
1977]
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Alternatively, the authors of the proposal suggest that some combina-
tion of these techniques could be used.
Once the total supplies of residential, commercial and industrial
rights have been determined, they would be distributed to each eligible
property owner in proportion to the ratio between the assessed value
of his property and the total assessed value of all real property in the
community.46 Each recipient would be issued a share of each "pool"
of rights based on this ratio.47 Owners of both undeveloped and devel-
oped property would receive rights, but that portion of rights "con-
sumed" by existing buildings could not be transferred until the as-
sociated buildings were demolished.18 Subject to the limits of the GMP,
all recipients would be free to sell or use their rights on their own
properties. Both the correct number and type of development rights
would be needed to develop a property.49
The GMP measure would first identify a total supply of rights based
not on existing zoning limits, as under the Chicago Plan, but rather on
capacities established by the GMP's environmental and public service
analysis. Next, rights would be allocated to eligible owners by a formu-
la which proportions this premium on the basis of assessed valuation.
Obviously, even if a timely, professional appraisal of all properties
could establish accurate assessments, grave uncertainties could result
among many property owners about personal losses and gains. If the
supply of rights to be apportioned was smaller than that possible using
existing zoning density criteria, logically each owner would receive
fewer rights. Unless a reduced supply of rights raised the unit price,
owners would suffer losses in the value of their real property holdings.
The probabilities inherent in such a gamble would seem sufficiently
vague to place the TDR proposal in a politically, if not legally, vulner-
able situation in most communities.
Nevertheless, still another provision exists in the distribution formu-
la to alter the market value of each owner's property. The New Jersey
scheme would allocate a share of each residential, commercial and
industrial type of right to each eligible owner, regardless of the current
corresponding number of development rights could be created for distribution. If one
acre of residentially-zoned land equalled one development right, 200 residential devel-
opment rights would be available.
46. B. CHAVOOSHIAN, G. NIESWAND & T. NORMAN, GROWTH MANAGEMENT PRO-
GRAM: A PROPOSED NEW APPROACH TO LOCAL PLANNING AND ZONING 1, 17-18 (1974).
47. Id. at 18. For example, if an individual owned one per cent of the total assessed
value in the community, he would receive one per cent of each pool.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 18-19.
[Vol. 14-81
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zoning classifications on his land. To illustrate, if an owner's residen-
tially zoned property constituted one percent of the total assessed
valuation in the municipality, he would receive one percent each of the
supplies of residential, commercial and industrial rights. Typically
undeveloped property zoned commercial or industrial commands a
higher unit price than comparable property zoned residential. Hence,
the owner is likely to gain from the transaction at the expense of
others. This principle is illustrated by comparing the owner's situation
above with that of a second owner whose land holdings are industrially
zoned and also constitute one percent of the total assessed valuation in
the municipality. The development rights separated from the second
owner's property would be added to the industrial rights "pool" for
later redistribution. Because more owners would subsequently be eligi-
ble to receive industrial rights, the second owner would receive fewer
in return and instead, would receive an allocation of residential and
commercial rights, of lesser unit values.50
Clearly, the GMP system would attempt to redistribute development
potential (in the form of development rights) more equitably than any
of the compensatory TDR schemes. However, another TDR plan, the
Carmichael proposal, is even more revisionary in the degree to which it
would redistribute development. The Carmichael proposal5' would pre-
face rights allocation with a relatively sophisticated McHargian ecolog-
ical analysis52 and a study of excess capacities in existing public serv-
ices. A plan for the jurisdiction would be prepared prescribing max-
imum allowable densities and land use types, as indicated by the
ecological and public services studies. For discussion purposes Car-
michael suggests establishing a residential development rights supply
50. In effect, the second owner would be forced to "trade in" a certain proportion of
the assessed value of his industrially-zoned land. This amount is represented by the
difference between the value of his industrial development rights and the value of the
mix of residential, industrial and commercial rights he is allocated from the "pool." In
other words, the first owner could realize a potential windfall and the second owner, a
partial wipeout.
51. Carmichael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control, 2
FLA. ST. U.L. REv. 35 (1974).
52. I. MCHARG, DESIGN WITH NATURE 103-15 (1969). Professor McHarg proposes an
analysis of suitability for development based upon the land's ecological carrying capac-
ity. A series of map overlays on transparent sheets would be prepared on a standard
base, each of which would depict the condition of a particular environmental element
(e.g.-depth to bedrock, acquifer recharge area, topography). Numerical ratings would
be assigned to denote the extent to which sections of the mapped area would be harmed
by development. Low ratings would prohibit development whereas higher ratings would
indicate the types of engineering modifications necessary to permit development of
greater intensity.
1977]
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equivalent to one right for each dwelling unit permitted by the plan. 53
As we have seen, the notion of creating rights as a function, not of the
zoning map but rather, of a detailed analysis of natural and public
services capacities, is found also in the GMP proposal. Unlike the
GMP however, the Carmichael formula would distribute development
rights regardless of either permissible densities under the plan or under
the zoning map.54
This variation of the Carmichael TDR scheme goes even further than
the New Jersey GMP measure in attempting to redistribute a publicly
created good. The latter shows some deference to original zoned
densities by distributing rights as a proportion of assessed valuation
(which typically, is calculated from market value, determined in part
by a parcel's zoning classification).5 5 It appears that, however tenuous-
ly, the New Jersey formula attempts to address not only the economic
issue of development rights redistribution but also, the legal issue of an
uncompensated taking. The Carmichael TDR variant, on the other
hand, would appear to minimize the importance of the property own-
er's original economic expectations and the just compensation issue.
Perhaps uneasiness over this rather ambitious formula contributed
to Carmichael's later discussion of alternative distributive devices. He
suggests, for example, that his original formula could be modified such
that a percentage of rights would be issued on the basis of acreage
owned and the remainder on the basis of some index of land suitability
for development.56 This reformulation would seem to narrow the gap
somewhat between the Carmichael and New Jersey proposals al-
though, as Professor Carmichael acknowledges, there are still many
uncertainties associated with the taking issue:
The assertions made in this article about the destruction, crea-
tion, transfer and bestowal of value by zoning practices should be
53. Unfortunately, Professor Carmichael discusses industrial and commercial devel-
opment rights in highly speculative terms. Therefore, no comments are warranted here.
54. Carmichael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control, 2
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 35, 51 (1974). For example, assume that Owners A & B each has 100
acres of residentially zoned land. The zoning map permits one and two dwelling units per
acre, respectively, on their properties. A & B both would be allocated 100 rights.
Assuming residential rights have been created at one right per dwelling unit permitted in
the new plan, each owner, in effect, would have rights fungible as permission for 100
dwelling units. Under the zoning map, Owner A would have been allowed 100 units;
therefore, ostensibly, he has neither gained nor lost under the Carmichael formula.
Owner B though, would have had permission for 200 dwelling units under zoning; he has
lost approximately 50 per cent of the value of his property according to this criterion.
55. See text accompanying note 46 supra.
56. Carmichael, Transferable Development Rights as a Basis for Land Use Control, 2
FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 35, 101 (1974).
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fully verified and documented. Special attention should be given
to the precise dimensions of the taking problem. In both cases, the
adjustments of entitlements and the avoidance of inequities that
would hopefully result from the use of development rights should
be fully explored. 57
IV. CONCLUSIONS ON TDR
The preceding discussion has attempted to show that both compen-
satory and redistributive TDR measures raise timorous doubts about
their societal impacts. That they could upgrade land use planning and
management practices and preserve environmental and historic re-
sources is plausible at the least. That the compensatory TDR approach
could do so without violating legal requirements posed by the taking
issue is also not contested. Compelling arguments both supporting and
refuting this position have been advanced.5 8 It is also a defensible
position that the redistributive approach could spread the economic
benefits deriving from a publicly created commodity such as devel-
opment rights over a broader population. But, under either compensat-
ory or redistributive approaches it seems an inescapable conclusion
that some population groups would be more heavily burdened with the
costs of achieving TDR's objectives than would others. Those who
relinquish an increment of property value in the reallocation of indus-
trial rights under the New Jersey GMP or Carmichael schemes, for
example, to some extent are analogous to devlopers and tenants/pur-
chasers under the Georgetown and Chicago TDR measures. Preserva-
tion costs are imposed on each group under formulae that bear little
obvious relationship to criteria based either on measures of horizontal
or vertical equity.59 Thus, both types of TDR measures maldistribute
costs as among the population groups to which they are directed.
57. Id. at 106.
58. Without doubt, the most forceful and perceptive arguments buttressing the pre-
sumed legality of TDR have been made by Professor Costonis. See SPACE ADRIFT, note
31 supra; Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J.
75 (1973). For critical commentary, see generally, Berger, The Accommodation Power in
Land Use Controversies: A Reply to Professor Costonis, 76 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1976);
Note, The Unconstitutionality of Transferable Developmental Rights, 84 YALE L.J. 1101
(1975); Note, Development Rights Transfer in New York City, 82 YALE L.J. 338 (1972).
59. Under horizontal equity, persons of comparable economic circumstances would
pay at generally comparable rates in order to preserve an historic or environmental
resource. Under vertical equity, persons of unequal status would pay in accordance with
their financial ability to do so. The concept of a progressive tax system, for example,
illustrates both horizontal and vertical equity.
Professor Costonis alludes to the equity argument in his contention that TDR would
"close the externalities loop." Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An Exploratory
Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75, 100 (1973). That is, the costs imposed on a community from
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Not only do these measures fail the ability-to-pay test, but their
costs are even more inequitably skewed when compared to the total
proportion of a given population that is beneficiary to TDR's presumed
preservation services. Theoretically, a protected resource such as
scenic open space or a historic mansion is a public good. That is, it is a
commodity which, "if available to anyone, is equally available to all
others."'  To be sure, in practice TDR's preserved resources are not
likely to be equally accessible to all income or age groups in a juris-
diction. But it is just as certain that those who do have access and can
visually enjoy a verdant meadow or an Italianate Victorian townhouse
compose a considerably larger population than the burdened groups
identified under compensatory and redistributive TDR measures.
Therefore, it would seem compellingly apparent that TDR schemes of
whatever stripe are likely to fail a test of equitability based on the
criterion of benefits derived.
Unfortunately, the courts have dwelled rather restrictively on the
compensation uncertainties associated with TDR and thus, have not
chosen to explore these more difficult equity issues. The recent TDR
cases Fred French Investing Co. v. City of New York6 and Penn
environmental degradation and the resultant public services necessary to reduce its
impact typically, are external to the economics of the development process. The commu-
nity, he maintains, must absorb these costs through taxes and other charges imposed by
local governments. Requiring the initiator of these burdens, the developer, to pay some
or all of the costs associated with them is an important purpose of law, he claims, and
thus, justifies requiring him to purchase development rights in order to exceed existing
zoned densities.
Unhappily, Professor Costonis' perceptive argument was developed no further here.
The methodology by which to compute the distribution of the costs of land development
to their rightful bearers is extremely complex. See, e.g., T. MULLER, FISCAL IMPACTS OF
LAND DEVELOPMENT 1-60 (1975). The myriad revenues accruing to the community in the
form of taxes, fees and user charges, as well as new employment from high density
development, render the identification of community benefits at least as difficult as the
determination of community impacts or negative externalities. It is by no means appa-
rent then, that Professor Costonis' argument dispenses with legitimate concern over
TDR's questionable equity implications.
60. Margolis, The Demand for Urban Public Services, in IssUES IN URBAN ECONOMICS
539 (H. Perloff and L. Wingo eds. 1969).
61. 39 N.Y.2d 587, 350 N.E.2d 381, 385 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976). The case involved the
rezoning of an apartment complex in New York City to a park classification which
prohibited demolition and redevelopment of the site to more intensive uses. The Tudor
Parks complex had incorporated two private parks for use of its residents. Under the
rezoning, these parks were to be open to the public. As compensation, the owners of the
complex were given permission to transfer the development rights to other lots in the
general vicinity of Tudor Parks in order to achieve greater densities on those sites than
was possible under existing zoning categories. However, the conversion of the parks
from private to public use was to occur even before the development rights transfers
took place, thus depriving the owners of their property before the market for (and
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Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York62 do not cast much
illumination on the equity issue.
therefore, the value of) development rights could be ascertained. The court ruled in
favor of the owners and affirmed that the tenuous nature of development rights value did
not, in fact, constitute just compensation in the Tudor Parks arrangement. In addition, it
noted that the properties zoned strictly for public park usage had been deprived of any
significant financial value and thus, that the park rezoning decision amounted to a taking.
See 90 HARV. L. REV. 637 (1977); 14 URBAN L. ANN. 283 (1977).
62. 50 App. Div. 2d 265, 377 N.Y.S.2d 20 (1975), aff'd, 10 E.R.C. 1389 (N.Y. Ct.
App. 1977). The decision involved a plan by the owners of Grand Central Station in New
York City to build a 59-story office tower above the landmark Beaux Artes-style building
built in 1913. Preservationists staunchly opposed Penn Central's efforts to seek a
compromise between preservation of the terminal and redevelopment to higher income
producing uses. The city denied permissions necessary to execute the reconstruction
project, granting Penn Central the right to transfer the terminal's development rights to
nearby sites thus, increasing existing zoned densities at those locations. Penn Central
claimed that a taking had resulted because neither the existing terminal usage of Grand
Central nor potential sale of development rights constituted just compensation for the
lost return attributable to an office tower.
The appellate court upheld the lower court's decision that a taking had not occurred. It
asserted that market demand for development rights in the terminal's vicinity was more
promising than under Tudor Parks and that the existing or potential uses of the terminal
were sufficiently economical to thwart the charge that preservation of the building
amounted to a financial hardship. Most importantly, the court asserted that the principle
of just compensation, as under eminent domain proceedings, did not apply in Penn
Central and that the plaintiffs were not due compensation according to the return likely
if the tower were incorporated into the terminal. Instead Penn Central had a right only to
financial return commensurate with the proportion of the property's value deriving from
the company's investment.
A fair return is to be accorded the owner, but society is to receive its due for its
share in the making of a once great railroad. The historical, cultural and architectur-
al resource that remains was neither created solely by the private owner nor solely
by the society in which it was permitted to evolve.
10 E.R.C. at 1392.
Penn Central confines itself to defining the limits of compensation due the Penn
Central Railroad and the rightful benefits accruing to society from prior public largesse.
In so doing, the court comes down foursquare on the side of partial public recoupment of
values created in part by governmental action (e.g., government grants for Penn Central
land, real estate tax exemptions, service to the terminal by the city-owned public transit
system).
Professor Costonis, in effect, anticipated the court's decision in Penn Central four
years earlier. "Development rights transfer promises to redress the most grievous
consequence of the American Property system's bias in favor of private property rights;
the government's failure to recoup for public use an appropriate measure of the values
that it creates in privately held land." Costonis, Development Rights Transfer: An
Exploratory Essay, 83 YALE L.J. 75, 97-98 (1973).
Nevertheless, nowhere does the court grapple with the broader equity issue inherent in
the question of who are the ultimate financiers of Grand Central's preservation. The
transferable development rights, an essential element in the compensation scheme, are
to be purchased by property owners of sites in the terminal's general vicinity. In effect,
then, they become partial subsidizers of the building's preservation. In return for
purchased density increases, which presumably are available through conventional zon-
ing change procedures, they and their ultimate tenants/purchasers help to pay for a
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The transfer of development rights concept purports to achieve a
public purpose virtually at no cost to the public fisc. Indeed, therein
lies the chief attraction to its proponents. Nonetheless, if the above-
mentioned liabilities are to be nullified, it appears necessary to relin-
quish this feature. The cost of protecting an important environmental
or architectural resource must be borne not merely by a few devel-
opers and perhaps, several tenants/purchasers, but rather in a more
equitable arrangement, by a broader spectrum of society. It is not
surprising, then, that at this writing, one such proposal already has
emerged.
A. Public Intervention in the Transfer Process: An Alternative
The Puerto Rico Plan represents a decided departure from a literal
TDR device. 63 Like most TDR schemes, it would impose restrictive
land use controls where dictated by analysis of environmental, public
services and design conditions. 64 Landowners who claim that they are
denied a reasonable return from their property by this action could
submit to a rather elaborate Commonwealth adjudication procedure.5
If their contentions are denied, no compensation would be forthcom-
ing. If their contentions are upheld however, various alternatives,
including the public purchase of development rights, could be used to
provide compensation.66 An environmental trust fund would be estab-
lished to finance property acquisitions by the government. 67 Its capital
would derive from Commonwealth government appropriations, private
gifts and federal grants.68 The fund, under Commonwealth director-
ship, would be empowered to sell development rights and other inter-
ests in land, using the revenue for further property acquisitions.
Transfer districts would be delineated through the same types of
rigorous analytical procedures as preservation districts. Eligible pro-
perty owners within a district would be able to purchase development
rights and other premiums from the Commonwealth at prices estab-
public good. Notwithstanding the voluntary nature of these purchases, the court's
scrutiny is sorely needed here to clarify the cloudy dynamics of equitability. It remains
unclear in Penn Central why a rather narrow class of New York City residents must bear
the ultimate burden of costs for a benefit which is available virtually to all those who live
in or visit the city.
63. J. COSTONIS & R. DEVoY, THE PUERTO Rico PLAN: ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
THROUGH DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS TRANSFER (1975).
64. Id. at 9-Il.
65. Id. at 13-16.
66. Id. at 23.
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lished through negotiations or public bidding procedures. 69 Each pro-
perty would be designated a certain density of right, based on the
environmental, public services and design analyses. Owners would be
free to build to that level, subject only to conventional regulations such
as subdivision codes. 70 However, a second, higher "tier" would be
delineated, where compatible with the analyses.7' Owners who pur-
chase the prescribed number and type of development rights would be
allowed to exceed the density of right and build to this second level.72
The Puerto Rico Plan places special emphasis on the process by
which the determination to compensate is to be made. Though too
complex to describe adequately in this Article, its pivotal feature is a
concept termed "reasonable beneficial use." 73 It would be the role of
the Commonwealth Board of Appeals to determine to what extent, if
any, a claimant's allowable property uses, as designated by the land
use plan, were of lesser value than the reasonable beneficial use.74 If,
for example, the board adjudged this use to be agriculture and the
parcel under appeal had been designated for agricultural uses by the
plan, no compensation would be due. If on the other hand, the rea-
sonable beneficial use was deemed to be multi-family housing, the
same parcel could merit compensation for the net difference in value.
The authors of the Puerto Rico scheme specify several criteria by
which the reasonable beneficial use for each parcel of property under
appeal is to be established.75
The transfer aspect of the Puerto Rico Plan is more metaphorical
than literal. Under no circunstances would development rights trans-
fers occur between private citizens, as under the TDR measures de-
scribed earlier. The prices of rights and hence, the compensation
received, would never be determined solely by the vicissitudes of
market supply and demand. Each landowner could appeal his proper-
ty's designation under the plan and where found to have been denied a
reasonable return, could obtain appropriate relief from the Common-
69. Id. at 9-10, 19.
70. Id. at 10.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 16.
74. Id.
75. Id. Among the criteria specified by the authors are: (1) claimant's current total
investment in the property, (2) the degree of harm posed to the environmental resource
by the proposed development, (3) development potential at the site, as influenced by
location, access, size, shape, topography, proximity to sewer and water service and
liability to flooding.
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wealth.76 This compensation would be fixed in a formal appeals proc-
ess, with the option to submit resultant decisions to the judiciary. 77
This procedure parallels appeals and court review alternatives avail-
able to property owners in conventional zoning cases in the United
States.
As we have seen, there are other resident groups affected by a TDR
measure besides those owners who receive compensation for lost
development potential. How would these persons fare under the Puer-
to Rico Plan's intervention in the private transfer process? The answer
derives in large measure from the fact that the Plan obligates the public
fisc to underwrite the costs of environmental protection.78 In compen-
satory and redistributive TDR approaches, these responsibilities are
imposed on certain members of certain population groups (e.g., devel-
opers in transfer districts) and would seem to be especially inequitable
when other members of the same groups (e.g., developers in other
parts of the community) are able to obtain density increases without
paying for them. The Puerto Rico Plan appears to be a departure
point, at the least, for a system which could distribute protection costs
more equitably among those who derive the benefits. By intervening in
the transfer process between seller and buyer of premiums such as
development rights, the Plan would break the dependency linkage
between land protection and sustained demand for rights that exists in
compensatory and redistributive TDR systems. A protection mecha-
nism would exist regardless of the magnitude of demand for devel-
opment rights. 79
Certain advantages in the Puerto Rico Plan are noteworthy. First,
the public sector, being the sole source of compensation, would be in a
position to decide in each case if and to what extent compensation is
necessary. If compensation is to be proferred, the appropriate govern-
ment can use its full faith and credit to guarantee that it will be
forthcoming. Under previously described TDR schemes, these deci-
76. Id. at 18.
77. Id.
78. Id. at 9. Though the Puerto Rico Plan would pay direct compensation through
development rights transfer purchases, it would also empower the administering agency
to provide alternatives to compensation such as the granting of a zoning variance, where
appropriate.
79. Confidence in the value of a public intermediary in the transfer process is shared
by others. See Field & Conrad, Economic Issues in Programs of Transferable Devel-
opment Rights, 51 LAND EcONOMIcs 338-39 (1975).
[Vol. 14:81
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol14/iss1/5
TRANSFER OF DEVELOPMENT RIGHTS
sions are rendered moot through resort to the market system and its
attendant uncertainties."0 Second, the public sector is in a better
position under Puerto Rico-type arrangements to decide how its pres-
ervation dollars should be allocated so as to encourage the optimal
public benefit from its investment. Obviously, once a TDR system
designates which environmental resources are to be protected, the
number, type, location and timing of those actually preserved through
the transfer process are left to the vagaries of market supply and
demand forces. Participation in this market is limited to those persons
permitted under each TDR measure who are wealthy enough to do so.
In effect, they would decide for the public what resources will be
preserved.
Finally, the governmental assumption of preservation costs under
the Puerto Rico Plan offers considerably more potential than either
compensatory or redistributive TDR schemes for distributing the
economic burdens according to some just, proportional basis. These
latter approaches falter most severly by assigning the costs of protect-
ing historic buildings, farmland and other resources to a relatively
small proportion of a community's population. This condition seems
most inequitable when compared to the much broader distribution of
benefits accruing to citizens as a result of these protection measures.
In effect, a relatively small number of people are forced to subsidize a
resource, the benefits of which will accrue to a much larger number of
people. Certainly, that some should pay more than others, in principle,
is acceptable, if costs are distributed on the basis of ability-to-pay.
But, that some group should finance all of the costs when benefits
from resource preservation, though not readily calculable, accrue con-
siderably more widely, seems manifestly unjust. A Puerto Rico-type
measure might offer a governmental vehicle by which more equitable
horizontal and vertical distributions of costs and benefits could be
achieved. 8'
80. Nearly all of the TDR measures publicly proposed to date require the transfer of
development rights to occur between individual buyers and sellers, operating analogous-
ly to traditional procedures in local real estate markets. The market value of a given
development right therefore, is dependent on supply and demand factors. Under the
Puerto Rico Plan, when compensation is deemed appropriate, it is underwritten by the
Environmental Trust Fund, thus avoiding the problem of undervalued development
rights.
81. At least one local government recently has implemented a program akin to the
Puerto Rico scheme. Suffolk County, New York is proposing a $60 million bond issue to
purchase development rights in order to preserve agricultural land. The enacting legisla-
tion suggests that, eventually, some of the purchased rights could be sold by the county
government to permit greater densities in portions of the county where growth is desired.
See Peterson & McCarthy, These Farmers Said. 'No Sale!', 41 PLAN. 20-21 (1975).
1977]
Washington University Open Scholarship
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
To be sure, demurrers can be expected from students and victims of
tax policy, citing myriad examples of patently maldistributed economic
burdens. Nonetheless, for all the shortcomings of traditional devices to
allocate public costs fairly, it is not obvious that the concept of taxa-
tion, per se is inconsistent with that objective. Compensatory and
redistributive TDR measures, on the other hand, seem inherently at
odds with such an end.
The foregoing judgements notwithstanding, one caveat is due here.
To this point, pessimism has been expressed for the use of compensat-
ory and redistributive TDR schemes as integral and dominant land use
control systems. These observations do not necessarily negate the
value of occasional TDR applications on a limited, property by proper-
ty, voluntary basis within a given local government jurisdiction. It is
conceivable that in isolated circumstances the technique might be used
with minimal violence to the criteria raised in the present Article.82 As
should be evident, TDR is a complex concept with a myriad of
variants. This characteristic alone would suggest that it deserves more
intensive scrutiny and testing than has occurred to date before final
judgments are made. 83 At the current state of their developmental
history however, both compensatory and redistributive TDR systems
appear to have engendered optimism somewhat inconsistent with cer-
tain of their ostensible limitations.
82. 2 Record of the Public Hearing Before the Assembly Municipal Government
Committee on Bill No. 3192 45x-49x (1975) (testimony of D. Gale). This legislation is not
to be confused with the New Jersey GMP proposal discussed in the present Article.
83. Others lament the paucity of efforts at analytical scrutiny applied to TDR to date
and call for an evaluation of the impacts of TDR and other land use controls on the "total
social fabric." See Drummond, Book Review, 7 GROWTH AND CHANGE 52 (1976) (M.
LEVIN, J. ROSE & J. SLAvET, NEW APPROACHES TO STATE LAND-USE POLICIES); F. JAMES
& D. GALE, ZONIRG FOR SALE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF TRANSFERABLE DEVELOPMENT
RIGHTS PROGRAMS 1-39 (1977). Perhaps the most ambitious economic analyses of TDR to
date has been performed by the Regional Science Research Institute. See note 36 supra.
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